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NOTES
Protecting Alaska’s Children from
Neglect: The Appropriate Legislative
Response to In re S.A. and
R.J.M. v. State
This Note analyzes two recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions
that limit the state from assuming jurisdiction over certain types of
neglected children. The Note urges the Alaska Legislature to
adopt a proposed amendment to the Children in Need of Aid
(“CINA”) chapter that will counter the judicial interpretation of
the existing chapter and permit the state to intervene on the behalf
of neglected children. Specifically, the proposed amendment
would provide protection for children who suffer from current
and/or prospective emotional and mental neglect. The Note argues that the proposed amendment would allow the state an
“appropriate” level of authority to intervene in a family and
would permit the state to achieve the original goals of the CINA
chapter.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Supreme Court has jeopardized Alaska’s ability to
protect its children through two divided opinions that have sharply
curtailed when children can be found to be children in need of aid
(“CINA”) under Alaska statutory law. In January 1996, the su1
preme court in In re S.A. overruled three of its own cases and decided that Alaska courts do not have jurisdiction to intervene on a
child’s behalf based solely on evidence that a parent is willing but
2
unable to provide for a child’s needs. In September 1997, the suCopyright © 1997 by Alaska Law Review
The author would like to thank Assistant Attorney General Jan Rutherdale, Professor Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Lauralyn Beattie, and the staff of the
Alaska Law Review for their assistance.
1. 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
2. See id. at 1241 (overruling In re A.M., 891 P.2d 815, 824 (Alaska 1995), In
re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941, 945 (Alaska 1994), and In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 170
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preme court in R.J.M. v. State3 decided that Alaska courts do not
have jurisdiction to intervene to protect a child based solely on
4
evidence that the child has suffered emotional neglect. While
many children in need of aid remain unaffected by these two decisions because they are protected by other subsections of the CINA
5
jurisdiction section, these decisions decidedly have left children
6
vulnerable in certain cases of neglect.
In response to the first decision, the Alaska legislature considered amending the CINA jurisdiction section to allow the state explicit authority to intervene on behalf of a child who does not have
7
a parent “able to care” for him or her. The legislation was not
8
adopted because the proposed amendment was too controversial.
Legislators and commentators considered the term “able” too
9
broad, and they were concerned that the term might lead to dis10
crimination against handicapped parents.
The Alaska Department of Law responded to these concerns
by proposing a narrower amendment to the CINA jurisdiction sec11
tion. Avoiding the broad language of the earlier legislative approach, the Department of Law’s new proposal concentrated on
protecting children from emotional, mental, and prospective ne(Alaska 1992) “to the limited extent that those cases stated that ability to care
may be considered under subsection [(a)(1) of the CINA statute, ALASKA STAT. 
47.10.010 (Michie 1996)]”).
3. No. S-7666, 1997 WL 578538 (Alaska Sept. 19, 1997).
4. See id. at *6-*11.
5. See ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a)(2)-(6) (Michie 1996).
6. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale, Assistant Attorney General for
the State of Alaska, to Hon. Kay Brown, Alaska State Representative 1-4 (Mar.
22, 1996) (on file with author); Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alaska, to Hon. Norman Rokeberg, Alaska State
Representative 5-10 (Mar. 13, 1996) (on file with author).
7. Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.R. 339,  2, 19th Leg., 2nd Sess.
(Alaska 1996), available in <http:www.legis.state.ak.us/folio.pgi/me19/query=
[jump!3a!27hb0339a!27]/doc/{@1447}?>.
8. See Telephone Interview with Hon. Norman Rokeberg, Alaska State
Representative (Feb. 13, 1997).
9. See Memorandum from Blair McCune, Assistant Public Defender, Alaska
Public Defender Agency, to John Salemi, Director, Alaska Public Defender
Agency 1 (Mar. 5, 1996) (on file with author).
10. See Alaska State Legislature Folio Infobase Web Server, 19th (1995-1996)
Legislature Bill Tracking and Information, H.R. 339, Feb. 15, 1996 House Health,
Education & Social Services Committee Minutes, 21-22 (visited Mar. 2, 1997)
<http://www.legis.state.ak.us/folio.pgi/cm19/query=[jump!3A!27hb339hes021596!
27]/doc/{@3002}?> [hereinafter February 15, 1996 Committee Minutes].
11. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale, Assistant Attorney General for
the State of Alaska, to Hon. Fred Dyson, Alaska State Representative 2-4 (Mar.
6, 1997) (on file with author).
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glect.12 The amendment would define the term neglect to mean the
13
“deprivation of the child’s physical, mental or emotional needs.”
The proposal narrowed in on protecting children in certain cases of
neglect because children in other harmful situations were still protected by other subsections of the jurisdiction section.
The Department of Law’s proposal has become more timely
in the wake of the more recent R.J.M. decision. The amendment
was introduced after S.A. because at that time it appeared there
were gaps in the state’s ability to protect its children. Now, R.J.M.
has made clear that the CINA jurisdiction section contains a serious gap in its ability to protect children in certain cases of neglect.
This Note encourages the Alaska legislature to adopt the Department of Law’s proposal because it provides the statutory foundation necessary for the protection of Alaska’s children. Part II of
the Note provides a background for the Department’s proposal.
Part III provides descriptions of the previous legislative proposal
and the Department of Law’s current proposal. Part IV argues
that the Department’s current proposal should be adopted because
(1) children should be protected from emotional, mental, and prospective neglect, (2) the proposal provides an appropriate standard
for intervention, and (3) the proposal is consistent with the rest of
the CINA chapter.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Alaska’s CINA Jurisdiction Section
The critical issue for an Alaska juvenile court in a child abuse,
neglect, or abandonment case is whether a minor qualifies as a
14
child in need of aid under Alaska statute. In making this determination, the court follows the standards laid out in the jurisdictional section of the CINA chapter, which gives the court the legal
15
authority to intervene in the life of a family to protect a child. Ultimately, the section can provide a court with the authority to ter16
minate parental rights.
The section delineates the following six circumstances in
which a court should find that a child is in need of aid:
(1) the child being habitually absent from home or refusing to
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a) (Michie 1996); see also TERESA W.
CARNS ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE COURT PROCESS FOR
ALASKA’S CHILDREN IN NEED OF AID 22 (1996). An edited version of the Alaska
Judicial Council report may be found at 14 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1997).
15. See ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a).
16. See id.  47.10.080(c)(3).
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accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian,
or relative caring or willing to provide care, including physical
abandonment by . . . [the child’s parent or parents;]
(2) the child being in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent substantial physical harm, or in need of treatment for mental harm as evidenced by failure to thrive, severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior or hostility toward others, and the child’s parent, guardian, or
custodian has knowingly failed to provide the treatment;
(3) the child having suffered substantial physical harm or if
there is an imminent and substantial risk that the child will suffer
such harm as a result of the actions done by or conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or the failure of
the parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the
child;
(4) the child having been, or being in imminent and substantial danger of being, sexually abused either by the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian, or as a result of conditions created by the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, or by the failure of the
parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the child;
(5) the child committing delinquent acts as a result of pressure, guidance, or approval from the child’s parents, guardian, or
custodian;
(6) the child having suffered substantial physical abuse or neglect as a result of conditions created by the child’s parent,
17
guardian, or custodian.

Most of these subsections have not created substantial contro18
versy and have been afforded their plain meaning by the courts.
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(6), however, have provoked litigation
19
concerning their coverage. The S.A. case and the original pro20
posal concern subsection (a)(1). The R.J.M. case and the De21
partment’s current proposal concern subsection (a)(6). This note
will concentrate primarily on these two subsections.
B. Subsection (a)(1) and the In re S.A. Decision
The core question under subsection (a)(1) is whether the inability of a parent to provide care authorizes a court to find a child
in need of aid. The subsection states that a child is in need of aid
as a result of “the child . . . having no parent, guardian, custodian,

17. Id.  47.10.010(a)(1)-(6). The term “neglect” is not defined in the
“Delinquent Minors and Children in Need of Aid” chapter. See id.  47.10.
18. See CARNS ET AL., supra note 14, at 23.
19. See, e.g., R.J.M. v. State, No. S-7666, 1997 WL 578538, at *6-*11 (Alaska
Sept. 19, 1997); In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1239-42 (Alaska 1996).
20. See S.A., 912 P.2d. at 1239-42.
21. See R.J.M., 1997 WL 578538, at *6-*11.
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or relative caring or willing to provide care . . . .”22 “Caring” and
“care” are defined as “provid[ing] for the physical, emotional,
23
mental, and social needs of the child.” Subsection (a)(1) clearly
protects three types of children: (1) a child who has run away from
home; (2) a child who has been abandoned; and (3) a child whose
parent is unwilling to care for him. A question that has arisen repeatedly is whether the subsection protects a fourth type of child:
24
one whose parent is unable to care for him or her.
Inconsistent messages from the Alaska Supreme Court between 1988 and 1995 created confusion over the subsection’s interpretation. The supreme court indicated in four cases that subsection (a)(1) permits a court to find a child in need of aid due to
25
parental inability to care for him or her. In one case, the court
quoted an earlier decision stating that “‘a finding of inability to
care would be grounds for jurisdiction under subsection
26
[(a)(1)] . . . .’”
Yet, during the same period, the court indicated in another
decision that the subsection permits a finding of jurisdiction only
27
when a parent is both unable and unwilling to provide care. In
that case, the court specifically examined the parent’s willingness
28
to care for the child. The court rejected the State’s attempt to
combine willingness and ability to care, explaining that “the State’s
conflation of willingness to care and ability to satisfy needs leads to
29
absurd conclusions.”
In S.A, a divided supreme court thoroughly analyzed the subsection for the first time and concluded that subsection (a)(1) does
not allow a court to protect children solely on evidence that the
30
parents are unable to care for them. It explicitly overruled three
of the cases that had stated courts could make a CINA determination simply based on evidence that the children’s parents were un31
able to care for them.
22. ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a)(1).
23. Id.  47.10.990(1).
24. See, e.g., S.A., 912 P.2d at 1239; In re A.M., 891 P.2d 815, 824 (Alaska
1995); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941, 945 (Alaska 1994); F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857,
861 (Alaska 1993); In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 169-70 (Alaska 1992).
25. See A.M., 891 P.2d at 824; T.W.R., 887 P.2d at 945; J.L.F., 828 P.2d at 170;
R.C. v. State, 760 P.2d 501, 504-05 (Alaska 1988).
26. T.W.R. 887 P.2d at 945 (quoting J.L.F., 828 P.2d at 170).
27. See F.T., 862 P.2d at 861.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1238-42 (Alaska 1996).
31. See id. at 1241-42 (overruling In re A.M., 891 P.2d 815, 824 (Alaska 1995);
In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941, 945 (Alaska 1994); In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 170
(Alaska 1992)). The court did not mention R.C., which had also stated that a
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The court based its decision on the plain language of the subsection and on the structure and purpose of the CINA statute.32 It
concluded from its plain-language analysis that the provision
“caring or willing to provide care” means that a parent needs to ei33
ther be able to care or be willing to care, not both. The court rejected the State’s argument that the legislative definition of the
terms “care” and “caring” for this subsection changes this read34
ing. The court noted that
plugging the definition [of “care” and “caring” into the subsection] . . . results in the following: “having no parent . . . providing
for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child
or willing to provide for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child.” The statute still would not require abil35
ity to care — willingness is enough.

The court also concluded that its interpretation of subsection
(a)(1) fits into the structure and purpose of the jurisdiction section,
which is intended to protect children from specific instances of
36
The court explained that the
“severe parenting deficiencies.”
subsequent subsections cover the inability to provide medical
treatment, conduct that causes or creates a substantial risk of substantial physical harm, sexual abuse, a parent’s encouragement of a
37
The
minor’s delinquent acts, and physical abuse and neglect.
court stated that subsection (a)(1) fits into this structure because it
covers “situations where the parent abandons the child, the child
38
runs away, or the child refuses to accept the parent’s care.”
Based on this analysis, the court gave three reasons why, given
the structure and purpose of the jurisdiction section, ability to care
39
is not relevant under the subsection. First, the State’s interpretation that the subsection allows jurisdiction based on parental inability “would permit CINA adjudications based on parenting deficiencies much less severe than those covered” in the other
40
Second, the other subsections “set clear, specific
subsections.
standards for adjudicating a child [to be a child in need of aid]
41
based on a parent’s inability to care,” distinguishing them from
CINA determination could be based on parental inability. See R.C. v. State, 760
P.2d 501, 504-05 (Alaska 1988).
32. See S.A., 912 P.2d at 1239.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1239-40.
35. Id. at 1240.
36. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(B)-(F) (Michie 1995),
amended by ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010 (a)(2)-(6) (Michie 1996).
37. See S.A., 912 P.2d at 1240.
38. Id. at 1241.
39. See id. at 1240.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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the State’s broad interpretation of the first subsection.42 Third, the
remaining subsections would be virtually “superfluous” if a court
43
could base a CINA adjudication simply on ability to care.
The dissent, which was written by Justice Eastaugh and joined
by Justice Compton, had a different interpretation of the subsec44
tion. The dissent read the subsection as focusing on two problems:
(1) conduct of the child which deprives the child of available care
(“the child being habitually absent from home,” i.e., running
away, or “refusing to accept available care”); and (2) want of a
person (parent, or guardian, custodian, or relative) to provide
care to the child (“the child . . . having no parent . . . caring or
45
willing to provide care”).

The dissent reasoned that the subsection addresses two situations
46
but concerns one problem: deprivation of care.
Using this analysis, the dissent disputed what it deemed the
majority’s conclusion “that willingness to provide care can substi47
tute for delivery of care.” The dissent argued that “caring” and
“willing to provide care” were not equal alternatives, but were
both conditions that have to be met in order for CINA jurisdiction
48
to exist. It reasoned that “jurisdiction exists if the child’s needs
. . . are not currently being met (no one is now ‘caring’ for the
child), and . . . will not be met by other eligible persons (no one is
49
‘willing to provide care’ in the future).” The legislature, according to the dissent, did not want good intentions to substitute for a
child’s receipt of care.
The Alaska Supreme Court has followed the S.A. decision in
50
subsequent cases. The court has clarified its interpretation of
51
willingness, most recently in R.J.M., finding that a lower court
may look at more than just a parent’s statement that he is “‘willing
52
to care for a child.’” A court must instead “look to objective
conduct in determining whether a parent is willing to provide

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1243-45 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1244 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See In re J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Alaska 1996); R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d
754, 756-57 (Alaska 1996).
51. See O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303, 1310 (Alaska 1997).
52. R.J.M. v. State, No. S-7666, 1997 WL 578538, at *13 (Alaska Sept. 19,
1997) (quoting O.R., 932 P.2d at 1310).
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care.”53 This clarification did not change S.A’s central holding that
54
a court may not consider ability in subsection (a)(1).
C. Subsection (a)(6) and the R.J.M. v. State Decision
According to subsection (a)(6), a child who has “suffered substantial physical abuse or neglect as a result of conditions created
by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian” is a “child in need of
55
aid.” In R.J.M., the supreme court considered whether the language of subsection (a)(6) limits the term neglect to substantial
56
physical neglect. In another divided decision, the supreme court
in R.J.M. held that the “phrase ‘substantial physical abuse or neglect’ means ‘substantial physical abuse’ or ‘substantial physical
neglect,’” thus removing CINA coverage from children who are
57
the victims of emotional and other types of non-physical neglect.
There are three possible interpretations of the subsection: (1)
“substantial” and “physical” could modify both abuse and neglect;
(2) “substantial” could modify both while “physical” could modify
only abuse; and (3) “substantial” and “physical” could modify only
58
abuse. The court reasoned that its reading was proper “as a mat59
ter of syntax alone.” According to the court, placing the adjective
“substantial” both with abuse and neglect while placing the adjective “physical” only with abuse strains the reading of the subsec60
tion.
The court also stated that the common definitions of “abuse”
61
and “neglect” support its reading of the subsection. According to
the court, “‘abuse’ means ‘wrong, bad, or excessive use[;] . . . mistreatment; [or] injury,’ while ‘neglect’ means ‘lack of sufficient or
62
proper care; negligence[; or] disregard.’” The court reasoned that
there is no difference between the quality or quantity of the harm
63
here; the only difference is between active and passive harm. Because of the similarity of abuse and neglect, the court reasoned
64
that the same modifiers should be read for both.
The court also found this narrow reading to be consistent with

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
See id. (citing In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1242 (Alaska 1996)).
ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a)(6) (Michie 1996).
See R.J.M., 1997 WL 578538, at *6.
Id. at *6.
See id. at *17 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at *6.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at *6-*7.
See id.
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the five other jurisdiction subsections.65 Otherwise, according to
the court, “we would convert subsection [(6)] from a provision
stating a ‘clear specific standard[,]’ and describing a ‘serious form
. . . of parental misconduct,’ into a general provision that would
enable the State ‘to assume custody over any child who had needs
66
the child’s parents could not meet.’”
Finally, the court rejected the State’s argument that the definition of neglect in the Child Protection chapter creates a different
interpretation of the subsection because the court noted that the
67
definition is restricted to that chapter alone. Neglect is defined in
the Child Protection chapter as “the failure by a person responsible for the child’s welfare to provide necessary food, care, clothing,
68
The court explained
shelter, or medical attention for a child.”
that the legislature could have a logical reason for having an expanded definition of neglect in that chapter for reporting purposes
69
due to a desire for more information. It also pointed out that the
adjective physical would still be added to neglect even if the defini70
tion was used.
In another strong dissent, Justice Eastaugh joined by Chief
Justice Compton disagreed with the court’s interpretation of the
subsection, reading “substantial” to modify both abuse and neglect,
but reading “physical” to modify only abuse and noting that the
71
syntax does not preclude such a reading. The dissent further interpreted the subsection to include emotional neglect because
72
“otherwise it would leave a substantial gap in coverage.” Such a
gap would not fit with the jurisdiction section as a whole, according
to the dissent, because the section provides “comprehensive pro73
tection.”
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In response to the S.A. decision, two legislative proposals
were made to protect the children left vulnerable by that decision.
The first proposal was eventually withdrawn because it was too
broad. The second proposal is the Department of Law’s proposal,
which has become more timely as a result of the R.J.M. decision.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at *8.
Id. (quoting In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1240-41 (Alaska 1996)).
See id. at *10-*11.
ALASKA STAT.  47.17.290 (10) (Michie 1996).
See R.J.M., 1997 WL 578538 at *10-*11.
See id.
See id. at *17 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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A. Previously Proposed Legislation to Amend Subsection (a)(1)
After the S.A. decision, the legislature considered changing
the CINA jurisdiction section, but withdrew the proposal when it
74
became controversial. At the time S.A. was decided, Representative Norman Rokeberg had already proposed legislation to deal
75
with another problem within the CINA sections. In its original
form, the bill proposed to enable courts to terminate the rights of
76
parents who were incarcerated for long periods of time.
When the S.A. decision was issued, Representative Rokeberg
77
amended his bill. The amendment proposed to change the language of subsection (a)(1) to allow CINA jurisdiction when a child
78
has no parent willing and able to care for him or her, reflecting
79
the statute’s interpretation before the S.A. decision. The proposal garnered support from the Department of Law and the Di80
rector of the Division of Family & Youth Services (“DFYS”).
Despite these endorsements, a number of legislators and the
public defender’s office raised concerns about the proposal. Specifically, two legislators were concerned that the term “able” might
81
provoke discrimination against the handicapped. There was also
a general concern that the amendment was too broad and would
expand too substantially the number of children for whom the
82
state could intervene. In the end, these concerns caused Representative Rokeberg to withdraw the section of the bill responding
83
to S.A., deciding that he did not want to jeopardize the original
84
bill. The legislature passed the termination of parental rights bill
into law on April 27, 1996, without a section responding to the S.A.

74. See February 15, 1996 Committee Minutes, supra note 10; see also Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra note 6; Telephone Interview with Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra note 8.
75. See Act Relating to Children-In-Need-of-Aid Proceedings, H.R. 339, 19th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1995), available in <http:www.legis.state.ak.us/folio.pgi/
me19/query=[jump!3a!27hb0339a!27]/doc/{@1447}?>.
76. See id.
77. See February 15, 1996 Committee Minutes, supra note 10.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Alaska State Legislature Folio Infobase Web Server, 19th (1995-1996)
Legislature Bill Tracking and Information, Judicial Committee Substitute for H.R.
339, Feb. 22, 1996 House State Affairs Committee Minutes (visited Sept. 20,
1997)
<http://www.legis.state.ak.us/folio.pgi/cm19/query=[jump!3A!27hb339sta
022296!27]/doc/{@4608}?>.
82. See Memorandum from Blair McCune to John Salemi, supra note 9.
83. See Telephone Interview with Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra note 8.
84. See id.
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decision.85
B. The Department of Law’s Recent Proposal to Amend
Subsection (a)(6)
In response to the concerns raised about the Rokeberg bill,
the Department of Law proposed a new amendment to respond to
86
the S.A. decision. While the Department proposed the amendment before the R.J.M. decision, its proposal is even more timely
in the wake of that decision.
The Department proposes that the legislature amend subsection (a)(6), rather than subsection (a)(1), and that it add a defini87
tion of neglect. Specifically, the Department urges the legislature
to amend subsection (a)(6) to state that a child is in need of aid as
a result of “the child having suffered or being at substantial risk of
suffering substantial neglect as a result of conditions created by the
88
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.” The Department proposes that the legislature define neglect as “the failure to provide
for a child’s physical, emotional, or mental needs, including the
failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attention, or the failure to provide for the child’s emotional or intel89
lectual development.”
This amendment would make a number of changes to subsec90
tion (a)(6). It first would remove the previous language regarding
91
“physical abuse.” The term “physical” should be removed be92
cause it is covered already by subsection (a)(3) and because it ex85. See Act Relating To Children-In-Need-of-Aid Proceedings, H.R. 339,
19th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1996), available in <http:www.legis.state.ak.us/
folio.pgi/me19/query=[jump!3a!27hb0339a!27]/doc/{@1447}?>.
86. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Fred Dyson, supra note
11.
87. See id. at 3-4. By focusing on neglect, the proposal avoids the overly
broad term “able” that was part of the Rokeberg bill. See id. at 2-4.
88. Id.
89. Alaska Department of Law, Proposed Amendments to ALASKA STAT. 
47.10.990, at 3 (1996) [hereinafter Department of Law Proposed Amendments]
(emphasis added). This definition of neglect would be added to Alaska Statutes
section 47.10.990 and pertain to Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(6). See
Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Fred Dyson, supra note 11, at 4.
90. The Department of Law also proposes that the legislature amend subsection (1) by deleting the language “including physical abandonment” and inserting
in its place “or having been physically abandoned.” Department of Law Proposed Amendments, supra note 89, at 1. This Note does not address this particular part of the amendment.
91. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Fred Dyson, supra note
11, at 2-4.
92. See ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a)(3) (Michie 1996).
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cludes other types of harm.
However, the removal of “abuse” is more problematic. While
child victims of “abuse” would still be covered by the term
“neglect” — as the supreme court pointed out in R.J.M., abuse and
neglect are “little more than two sides of the same coin” and
93
“these labels are often interchangeable” — leaving “abuse” in the
subsection would provide added protection. While “neglect”
would provide explicit protection for those children harmed
through a caregiver’s inaction, the term “abuse” would provide explicit protection for children physically, emotionally, or mentally
harmed through a caregiver’s action. Therefore, this Note departs
from the Department’s proposal on this one point and encourages
the legislature to leave the term “abuse” in the subsection.
The Department of Law’s proposal also would change subsection (a)(6) to cover emotional and mental harm by adding the
94
definition of neglect. Finally, it would cover prospective neglect
in the same way subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) cover other types of
95
prospective harm.
IV. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD PASS THE DEPARTMENT OF
LAW’S NEW PROPOSAL
As a result of the S.A. and R.J.M. decisions, the CINA jurisdiction section no longer protects children in cases of prospective,
emotional, or mental neglect. Before these two decisions, such
children were protected because the state had the authority to protect children whose parents were unable to care for them. Now
that the supreme court has determined that the jurisdiction section
does not allow such broad protection, the legislature should amend
the state’s neglect jurisdiction. The legislature should pass the Department of Law’s new proposal.
This part of the Note will outline why the legislature should
take this action. First, it will argue that the state should have the
authority to protect children from prospective, emotional, and
mental neglect. It will also discuss specific types of children who
would be protected by the amendment. Next, it will indicate why
the proposal provides for an appropriate standard of intervention.
Finally, it will illustrate how the structure of the Department’s
proposal is consistent with the rest of the CINA chapter.

93. R.J.M. v. State, No. S-7666, 1997 WL 5758538, at *7 (Alaska Sept. 19,
1997).
94. See Department of Law Proposed Amendments, supra note 89, at 3.
95. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Fred Dyson, supra note
11, at 2-4.
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A. Alaska Should Protect Children from Emotional, Mental, and
Prospective Neglect
The Alaska legislature has stated that one of the purposes of
the CINA sections is to serve the mental and emotional welfare of
96
Alaska’s children. Despite this stated purpose, Alaska currently
does not protect children from emotional or mental neglect as a re97
sult of the S.A. and R.J.M. decisions.
Experts believe that emotional harm is an extremely serious
98
threat to a child’s well-being. Children who are deprived of emotional and mental support may suffer lasting damage, including
behavioral problems, low school performance, pathology, depend99
ency, and lack of self-control. The legislature, therefore, should
protect children from mental or emotional neglect — just as it protects children from physical neglect — by adopting the proposed
amendment.
The amendment also would protect children from prospective
neglect. Alaska currently protects children from prospective
100
physical harm and prospective sexual abuse. These children do
not have to actually suffer harm before they are protected. In neglect cases, on the other hand, the state cannot protect children un101
til they actually suffer harm. For instance, if a parent has three
children and has physically harmed two of the children, the state
can intervene on behalf of the third child, in addition to the first
two children, if there is a substantial risk that the third child will
suffer physical harm. However, in a similar scenario, if a parent
neglects two of his children, the state cannot intervene on behalf of
the third child until the third child actually suffers the neglect her
siblings suffered.
Neglect may cause long-term harmful effects on children just
102
as do physical harm and sexual abuse. Neglected children may
96. See ALASKA STAT.  47.05.060.
97. See R.J.M., 1997 WL 5758538, at *5-*9; In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1241
(Alaska 1996).
98. See, e.g., James Garbarino, Future Directions, in CHILDREN AT RISK: AN
EVALUATION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 291,
292 (Robert T. Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990) (“As research moves
forward, there is growing recognition that psychological maltreatment is the
common thread that binds together all forms of maltreatment and accounts predominantly for developmental outcomes.”).
99. See generally Byron Egeland, A Longitudinal Study of High-Risk Families:
Issues and Findings, in THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: ISSUES AND
RESEARCH 33 (Raymond H. Starr, Jr. & David A. Wolfe eds. 1991).
100. See ALASKA STAT.  47.10.010(a)(3)-(4).
101. See id.  47.10.010(a)(6).
102. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE
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suffer from failure to thrive, absence of physical growth, dwarfism,
defiance, hostility, and risk of psychological harm.103 If the state
has convincing evidence that children are at grave risk of substantial neglect, the courts should have the power to authorize intervention to protect them before they are harmed.
While neglect laws vary widely in other states, a majority of
states have laws that protect the type of children the proposed
104
amendment would protect in Alaska. Alaskan children deserve
this same protection.
In order to illustrate the importance of the proposed amendment, the following will describe three types of children who could
be protected by this amendment. These types of children are (1)
children who witness domestic violence, (2) children of parents
with substance abuse problems, and (3) children whose older siblings were previously neglected. This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
NEGLECT 210, 210-11 (Anne C. Petersen et al. eds., 1993); Egeland, supra
note 99, at 51-52.
103. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 210-11.
104. These states have laws in the following categories. Ten states protect
children whose physical or mental health is endangered seriously due to parental
inability, acts or omissions. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  300(c) (West
1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 415.503(3) (1993); IND. CODE ANN.  31-6-4-3(a)(1)-(2)
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1996); LA. CHILDREN’S CODE ANN. art. 603 (14) (West
1995); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW  5-701(p)(1)-(2)(1991 & Supp. 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN.  41-3-102(5)(a)-(b) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN.  20-7-490(2)-(3) (Law
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,  4912 (1974 & Supp. 1996);
VA. CODE ANN.  63.1-248-2(1),(5) (Michie 1995); W. VA CODE  49-1-3(g)(1)
(1996).
Four states and the District of Columbia protect children who are without
proper parental care or control for their physical, mental, or emotional health. See
D.C. CODE ANN. 16-2301(9)(B) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.  38-1502(a)(1)-(3)
(1993 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN.  43-21-105(1) (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN.  169-C:3XIX(b) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE  27-20-02(5)(a)
(1991 & Supp. 1995).
Two states’ statutes protect a child of a parent who is unable to provide
for the physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child. See ARK. CODE ANN. 
12-12-503(6)(D) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.  13.34.030(4)(c) (West
1993 & Supp. 1997).
Finally, several states have general statutes which protect children who
lack adequate parental care. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  8-546(A)(6)-(7) (1989
& Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE  16-1602(t) (1979 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN.  600.020(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); MO. REV. STAT.  210.110(8) (1996);
N.M. STAT. ANN  32A-4-2 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.  7A-517(21) (1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  2151.03(A)(2)-(3) (1993 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10  1101(4) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.  419B.100(1)(e)(D) (1987);
R.I. GEN. LAWS  40-11-2(e) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  26-8A-2(2)-(5)
(Michie 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.  62A-4a-101(14) (1997).
AND
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1. Children who witness domestic violence. By providing
jurisdiction over cases involving “substantial emotional neglect,”
the proposal would reach children who suffer from long-term
exposure to domestic violence. Courts in other states have begun
to recognize the harmful emotional and psychological effects on
children who witness their parents physically or verbally abuse
each other over a long period of time and allow the protection of
105
Alaskan children should have this
children in these situations.
same protection.
A child’s exposure to domestic violence may have extreme
106
Recent research has shown
adverse impacts upon him or her.
that witnessing domestic violence may affect a child as much as if
107
The child may
the child actually had been physically harmed.
suffer post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) or have emotional
108
or behavioral problems that approach the severity of PTSD.
Witnessing domestic violence may also interfere with the child’s
development and cause the child to suffer from sleeplessness, poor
109
grades, and/or substance abuse. Male children who witness domestic violence are more likely to become abusers than other male
110
children. Finally, child abuse and neglect are more likely to oc111
cur in families where spousal abuse occurs.
In 1996, more than 5,000 domestic-violence victims in Alaska
sought services from programs funded by the Council on Domestic
112
Violence and Sexual Assault. The state should have the ability
to protect children who repeatedly witness such domestic violence

105. See In re B.M., 679 A.2d 891 (Vt. 1996); Adoption of Ramon, 672 N.E.2d
574 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 1996);
In re Michael M., 591 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. Ct. 1992); In re Theresa, 576 N.Y.S.2d
937 (App. Div. 1991).
106. See Phyllis E. Federico & Dr. Robert Kinscherff, Custody of Vaughn: Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody: Children Are No Longer the Forgotten Victims, 40 BOSTON BAR J. 8, 21 (1996) (“It is no longer scientifically controversial that exposure to violence may have profound and persisting adverse
impacts upon children.”).
107. See Barry Zuckerman et al., Silent Victims Revisited: The Special Case of
Domestic Violence, 96 PEDIATRICS 511, 511 (1995).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See David A. Wolfe & Barbara Korsch, Witnessing Domestic Violence
Dusting Childhood and Adolescence: Implications for Pediatric Practice, 94
PEDIATRICS 594, 597 (1994).
111. See id at 594.
112. See Memorandum from Derrick Cedars, Administrative Clerk for the
State of Alaska Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, to Janice Hill
at the Department of Law (Apr. 3, 1997) (estimating the number of domestic
violence victims for 1996 to be 5,196) (on file with author).
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to help the children avoid emotional damage and to break the continuing cycle of violence.113
2. Children of parents with substance abuse problems. While
the Alaska Supreme Court recently has allowed substance abuse to
114
be considered in a CINA proceeding, the proposed amendment
would more clearly allow courts to protect children of substance
115
Protecting such children is
abusers from prospective neglect.
particularly important in Alaska. Of the children involved in
CINA cases in Anchorage, 83% come from families where at least
116
Of the
one parent has a serious substance abuse problem.
children in Alaska who were removed from their homes by DFYS,
13% were removed specifically because their parents were
117
intoxicated at that time.
While the state currently can gain custody of these children
when a parent is under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the S.A.
decision may enable the parent to regain custody if he shows a
118
willingness to care for the child. For instance, a parent may have
neglected a child on numerous occasions when the parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. This parent may have entered rehabilitation to regain custody of his child. If the parent begins to use drugs or alcohol again, the state may not be able to
intervene until the child is actually neglected again. The proposed
amendment would allow a court to determine before the child is
neglected again whether there is a substantial risk that the child
119
will suffer neglect due to the parent’s relapse.

113. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra
note 6, at 9.
114. See In re J.W., 921 P.2d 604, 608 (Alaska 1996) (stating that substance
abuse is conduct sufficient to support a termination of parental rights, even when
the person’s status as an alcoholic is only an illness).
115. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra
note 6, at 5-10.
116. See CARNS ET AL., supra note 14, at 49 (citing CITIZEN’S REVIEW PANEL
FOR PERMANENCY PLANNING, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1996)). According to
the report, “[a]lcohol, cocaine and marijuana were the most frequently abused
drugs.” Id.
117. See id.
118. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Norman Rokeberg, supra
note 6, at 8-9.
119. In this circumstance, a court may find it has jurisdiction over the child under subsection (1) because the parent’s relapse demonstrates a lack of willingness
to care for the child. See O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303, 1310 (Alaska 1997). This
may not provide enough protection for the child due to the subjectivity of this
test. The proposed amendment would provide further protection for such a child
by making it clear that the court has jurisdiction if the child is in substantial dan-
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3. Children whose siblings were found to be neglected.
Finally, by providing jurisdiction over cases involving prospective
neglect, the proposed amendment would enable an Alaska court to
exercise jurisdiction over a child if the court determines that the
child is in substantial danger of neglect due to a prior neglect
adjudication of the child’s sibling. For instance, the proposed
amendment would cover a parent found guilty of substantially
neglecting her children due to a severe psychiatric problem. If the
parent has another child, and the parent’s condition has not
changed, then the proposal would allow a court to determine
whether the new child is at substantial risk of suffering neglect.
Research on the correlation of sibling neglect to neglect of
another child is surprisingly scarce. However, one commentator
has noted that “one of the most obvious features of neglectful
120
families is that everyone is neglected.”
As a result of the S.A. decision, Alaska courts probably do not
have jurisdiction to protect a child born to parents who already
have substantially neglected their other children until she herself
121
suffers substantial neglect. While courts may have sound reasons
not to intervene in such a situation, the legislature should give
courts the discretion to intervene when it is determined that there
is a substantial probability that the child will suffer the same harm
as the child’s sibling. Neglect can cause severe and permanent
122
The legislature should not force the courts to
harm to a child.
wait for a child to suffer such harm before it gives them authority
to act.
B. The Proposal Provides An Appropriate Standard For
Intervention
The legislature correctly refrained from passing the original
proposal to change subsection (a)(1) to allow CINA jurisdiction
123
when a parent is unable to care for a child. The original proposal
would have given the state too much authority to intervene in the
life of a family. Now the legislature should avoid making the opposite mistake. If the legislature fails to pass the Department’s
current proposal, the state may be helpless to intervene on behalf
of a child who is legitimately in need of aid.
ger of substantial neglect.
120. Patricia M. Crittenden, Research on Maltreating Families: Implications for
Intervention, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 158, 162
(John Briere et al. eds., 1996).
121. See Memorandum from Jan Rutherdale to Hon. Fred Dyson, supra note
11, at 3.
122. See, e.g., Egeland, supra note 99, at 51.
123. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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Since the 1970s, legal scholars and child advocates have debated the extent to which states should have authority to intervene
in the lives of families to protect a child.124 Since no advocates argue that the state should have broad authority to intervene in the
life of a family, the debate is limited to advocates of “minimum intervention” and advocates of “appropriate intervention.”
Advocates of minimum intervention argue that the state
should have only the authority to protect a child in the most ex125
These commentators have
treme cases of abuse and neglect.
three principal concerns with intervention. First, they believe that
126
intervention is harmful to a child. Each child, they argue, has an
127
innate need for a continuous bond with his or her parents. If the
128
bond is broken, a child will suffer permanent emotional damage.
Second, minimal interventionists believe intervention is not helpful
129
to a child. One commentator argues that a state does not have
the resources to improve a child’s situation when it provides serv130
ices to the parent or when it removes a child from her home. In
addition to a belief that states do not have the resources to help
children, this commentator has considered the possibility that children in abuse and neglect situations may not need help. He questions the extent of the detrimental effects that non-life-threatening
131
physical abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect has on children. Third,
124. See, e.g., Connie K. Beck et al., The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 669 (1978); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
“Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985
(1975); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
125. See James Donald Moorehead, Of Family Values and Child Welfare: What
is in the “Best” Interests of the Child?, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 521-26 (1996).
126. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 9 (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS] (“When
family integrity is broken and weakened by state intrusion, . . . [a child’s] needs
are thwarted and his belief that his parents are omniscient and all-powerful is
shaken prematurely. The effect on the child’s developmental progress is invariably detrimental.”).
127. See id. at 8-11.
128. See GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 124, at 20.
129. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 124, at 993.
130. See id.
131. “Except in cases where the beatings are so severe that death or maiming is
likely to occur, it is difficult to predict the long-term negative consequences for
the child that might be associated with having been abused.” Wald, supra note
124, at 1010. “[W]e cannot predict the consequences for a child of growing up in
a home environment that lacks affection or stimulation, or with a parent who suffers from alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, or retardation.” Id. at 102223. “[D]espite an abundance of theoretical material about the harm of sexual activity within the family, there are very few studies demonstrating the negative im-
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minimal interventionists believe the parents’ right to autonomy
should generally outweigh the state’s interest in protecting a
child.132
For these reasons, minimal interventionists argue that the
state should intervene only in the most extreme cases of abuse and
neglect. One noted group of minimal interventionists advocate intervention only when (1) the parents inflict, attempt to inflict or
repeatedly fail to prevent the infliction of serious bodily injury
upon their child, (2) there is a conviction of a sexual offense
against the child, (3) medical neglect arises, or (4) abandonment
133
occurs. In all other situations, this group believes the risk of in134
tervention exceeds the potential benefit.
Advocates of “appropriate intervention,” on the other hand,
argue that such extreme limitations on the authority of a state to
protect a child would place many children at too great a risk of
135
Instead, these advocates argue intervention is necessary
harm.
and appropriate when a child has suffered or is in danger of suf136
fering substantial maltreatment.
According to recent research, it is clear that maltreatment
137
A maltreated child has subcauses significant harm to a child.
stantially more problems than a similar child who has not suffered
138
maltreatment. Studies also show that a maltreated child is more
139
likely to maltreat his or her own children. An appropriate level
of intervention is necessary to stop the furtherance of these harms
to a child.
Furthermore, intervention does not cause as much harm to a
child as the minimal interventionists argue. Minimal interventionists have failed to provide evidence for the theory that state intervention into a child’s life harms the child by breaking up the conti-

pact of sexual ‘abuse.’” Id. at 1024-25.
132. See, e.g., id. at 991-93.
133. See GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 126, at 193-95.
134. See generally id.
135. See generally Moorehead, supra note 125, at 526-30.
136. See generally id. at 526-30.
137. See Egeland, supra note 99, at 51.
[F]indings indicate that children who are maltreated experience significant problems. Controlling for the effects of poverty and other aversive
environmental conditions associated with maltreatment, the maltreated
children showed maladaption at each period of assessment. The range
of outcomes varied, but each child showed some negative effect of maltreatment. No one was immune or invulnerable to the effects of maltreatment.
Id.
138. See id.
139. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 116-18.
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nuity of his bond with his parent.140 According to one commentator, “available evidence does not suggest continuity is essential for
normal childhood development. Quite the contrary — although
the research data is not yet definitive, separation from a disturbed
home, which produces an improvement in the child’s care, is often
141
preferable to a child’s remaining in the disturbed environment.”
She also notes that “[i]nadequate parental care appears to outweigh discontinuity as a determinant of long-range psychological
142
problems . . . .”
Also, a state should place the needs of a child above the right
of parental autonomy when these interests conflict. One advocate
argues that “‘[t]he current system is weighted toward giving
mother and dad a chance to get their life together. . . . It puts the
143
Anfamily first. . . . [The system should put] the child first.’”
other advocate suggests “‘[f]amily must always be examined as the
most important option for our children. . . . But if it is dangerous
then we should discard it as a possibility. The absolute best inter144
est of the child must guide our decision making.’”
A policy of appropriate intervention is consistent with the
Alaska legislature’s policy for the CINA sections. The legislature
has stated that the purpose of the CINA sections and other sections relating to children in the same title
is to secure for each child the care and guidance, preferably in
the child’s own home, that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the best interests of the
community; [and] to preserve and strengthen the child’s family
ties unless efforts to preserve and strengthen the ties are likely to
145
result in physical or emotional damage to the child . . . .

The legislative purpose prefers a child’s family unless the child will
suffer physical or emotional damage with the family. In this way,
the legislative purpose strikes a balance between the child’s family
and the child’s need for safety.
The Department’s current proposal provides this same balance. It does not create the broad authority to intervene that the
original proposal would have created. At the same time, it does
not leave the state helpless to protect a child from prospective,
emotional, or mental neglect when protection is warranted. In ef140. See Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the
Least Drastic Alternative?, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1764 (1987).
141. Id. at 1779-80.
142. Id. at 1786.
143. Marilyn Gardner, Tide Shifts on How to Protect Abused Children,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 1996, at 12 (quoting Richard Gelles, director
of the Family Violence Research Program at the University of Rhode Island).
144. Id. (quoting Jerry Stermer, president of Voices for Illinois Children).
145. ALASKA STAT.  47.05.060 (Michie 1996) (emphasis added).
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fect, it provides the state with the appropriate amount of authority
to intervene when and only when a child is in danger.
C. The Proposal is Consistent with the Rest of the CINA Chapter
The legislature also should pass the Department of Law’s
proposal because it is consistent with the rest of the CINA chapter.
As stated earlier, one of the purposes of the CINA sections is to
146
serve the mental and emotional welfare of Alaska’s children.
The Department’s proposal fulfills this purpose by protecting children from emotional and mental neglect.
Also, for the most part, the CINA jurisdiction section focuses
on the condition of the child rather than on parental fault. In contrast to the original legislative proposal that focused on parental
ability, the Department’s proposal follows the structure of the jurisdiction section by focusing on the condition of the child.
Finally, the proposal’s inclusion of prospective neglect is consistent with other subsections of the jurisdiction section. Subsec147
148
tions (a)(3) and (a)(4) cover prospective physical harm and
prospective sexual abuse to a child. The legislature has made the
policy choice not only to protect children who have been harmed,
but also to protect children in substantial and imminent danger of
being harmed. It follows, then, that the legislature should protect
both children who have been neglected and children who are in
substantial danger of being neglected.
V. CONCLUSION
Before the S.A. and R.J.M. decisions, Alaska had the authority to protect children who did not have parents able to provide for
149
their physical, mental, emotional and social needs. By restricting
this authority, the S.A. and R.J.M. decisions left the state helpless
146. See id.
147. The subsection creates jurisdiction in cases of
the child having suffered substantial physical harm or if there is an imminent and substantial risk that the child will suffer such harm as a result
of the actions done by or conditions created by the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian or the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the child . . . .
Id.  47.10.010(a)(3).
148. The subsection creates jurisdiction in cases of
the child having been, or being in imminent and substantial danger of
being, sexually abused either by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, or as a result of conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian,
or custodian, or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the child.
Id.  47.10.010(a)(4).
149. See In re A.M., 891 P.2d 815, 824 (Alaska 1995); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d
941, 945 (Alaska 1994); In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 169-70 (Alaska 1992).
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to protect children in certain neglect situations. The Department’s
proposal to amend subsection (a)(6) would restore a limited
amount of this authority. Most other states have laws similar to
the proposed amendment to protect their children.150 Alaskan
children deserve this same protection.
Charles Talley Wells, Jr.

150. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

